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Abstract 
 
This study employs bank-level data for a global sample to examine the relationship between capital 
and profitability over 2000-2013. Our evidence suggests that bank capital is positively related to 
bank profitability, although the estimated impact is relatively marginal. However, more capitalised 
banks that are more profitable appear to have a higher traditional risk, a greater proportion of non-
traditional activities in their balance sheets and they tend to be more effective at controlling their 
costs. The relationship depends on environmental conditions as well and bank size. It is typically 
stronger in crisis periods, in lower and middle income countries and for larger banks (but not for 
Global Systemically Important Banks, or GSIBs). Finally, for banks operating in less restricted, more 
unstable and corrupt environments, the same increase in capital is associated with more profitable 
institutions than banks operating in countries with lower corruption levels. Our findings are robust to 
different specifications and robustness tests, and carry important implications for policy reforms 
aimed at ensuring stability to the banking sector globally. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the role of capital for modern banks and the implications of their capital 
structure for profitability and risk have largely dominated the debates about international banking 
sector reforms. Post crisis, the demand for a more stable and safe banking sector has increased 
dramatically. While revisiting Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s seminal capital structure theory as it 
applies to banks, several prominent authors (e.g. Admati et al., 2013; Miles et al. 2012) highlight the 
benefits from introducing substantially higher equity requirements (up to 40%). Banks, in turn, argue 
that capital is expensive for their business and that such requirements would ultimately affect their 
performance, operations and lending activity. Thus, banks may react by shifting to non-traditional 
activities and unregulated parts of the financial system. 
For banking firms, debt is typically more attractive than equity for several reasons: the tax 
treatment that favours it over equity; its disciplinary role on bank managers; the presence of explicit 
guarantees (deposit insurance); its informational insensitivity that makes it less costly (Gorton, 
2010); and the lower risk propensity of depositors compared with other investors. One of banks’ 
typical arguments is that equity is more expensive than debt because it is riskier, therefore more 
equity will increase the overall cost of capital, thereby affecting performance via lower Return on 
Equity (ROE).
1
 If this holds true, the introduction of significantly higher capital requirements should 
increase banks’ private costs that eventually will result in money drained from the economy as banks 
will lend less and/or at a higher price.  
On the relationship between capital and profitability in banking, theory does not offer an 
unambiguous prediction. Recent theoretical studies argue for a positive relationship (e.g. Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1997; Allen et al., 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011) and base their predictions on the 
increased borrowers’ monitoring activity that follow an increase in capital. This occurs because of 
the lower moral hazard and the greater exposure of shareholders to potential losses in case of failure. 
Similarly, Berger (1995), one of the most cited early empirical works on the topic, finds that the 
relationship between capital and profitability measured by ROE is positive and robust to up to three 
lags for the variables of interest for the US banking sector. In addition, the author finds that the 
relationship can also run in the opposite direction, i.e. from profitability to capital. The most recent 
empirical literature employs either ROA and/or ROE and highlights the need to test the validity of 
the relationship across bank-specific factors such as bank size, cost effectiveness, and liquidity (e.g. 
Berger and Bowman, 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013). It also stresses the importance of accounting for 
                                                          
1
 However, as pointed out by Thakor (2014) in a world without taxes, a reduction in ROE due to a reduction in leverage 
is of no consequence for the bank’s shareholder value, if the change in leverage is not a distortion away from an optimal 
capital structure and the bank’s operating profit.  
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the economic cycle as both bank profitability and capital holdings tend to be procyclical. A related 
aim of this paper is to identify the ‘channels’ through which the relationship between bank capital 
and profitability may operate.  
The present study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, we employ a global 
sample of banks (asset size > constant US $100m on average over the sample period) operating in 
both the developed and emerging world for a period of 14 years. Hence our results should be robust 
to different economic cycles. Second, we adopt alternative measures of bank capital. Third, we 
control for micro (size, liquidity, lending characteristics, income diversification) and 
macro/environmental determinants (GDP growth, credit sector development), including a dummy for 
country-specific banking crises constructed following Laeven and Valencia (2012). Fourth, we 
identify possible channels (risk, business mix, and costs) that can help explain how the relationship 
between capital and profitability works. Finally, we evaluate how the relationships vary depending 
on country-specific banking crises, bank size, income levels (using the most updated World Bank 
income classifications), economic freedom, political stability, and corruption. As far as we are aware 
there are no similar studies carrying out such investigation for a global sample and a long time span 
that includes distress periods. 
We design our methodological framework in the vein of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) 
and carry out a pooled estimation where we include lagged bank capital variables and control for 
country and time fixed effects, to minimise endogeneity problems (which are however further 
investigated by means of additional robustness tests). Our findings clearly suggest a positive and 
significant relationship between capital and profits. This is true for all definitions of capital – both 
those that are linked to regulatory requirements and the crude leverage ratio. Our empirical evidence 
provides some support to the theoretical view that higher capital requirements translate in a stronger 
monitoring effect and greater safe investments that ultimately increase profitability (Berger, 1995; 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Nevertheless, we find that more capitalised banks that are more 
profitable have a higher traditional risk, a greater proportion of non-traditional activities in their 
balance sheets and they tend to be more effective at controlling their costs. In addition, the 
relationship depends on different environmental conditions as well as bank size. It appears to be 
stronger in crisis periods, for larger banks (but not for GSIBs), and in lower and middle income 
countries, although in this latter case the evidence is weaker. Finally, for banks operating in countries 
with lower economic freedom, less political stability and more corrupt environments, the same 
increase in capital is associated with a higher level of profits.  
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant empirical literature and 
identifies the main hypothesis. Section 3 explains the data and main methodological issues. Section 4 
discusses the results. Section 5 concludes and draws the key implications of the study. 
 
 
2. The relationship between capital and profitability in the empirical banking literature 
 
Over the past fifteen years or so, there has been a spurt of theoretical and empirical research 
on bank capital. Equally, the interest on bank profitability and its determinants has resulted in a 
plethora of literature focusing specifically on the relationship between earnings and market 
conditions. As comprehensively reviewed in Berger et al. (2004), these studies either focus on the 
collusion hypothesis (the SCP paradigm) and/or in the persistence of profit (POP) (see e.g. 
Chronopoulous et al., 2015). The models employed in these works typically do not include capital as 
a main variable of interest but test it as a control variable measured by book value of equity over 
total assets.  
There are however several empirical studies that investigate specifically the relationship 
between bank capital and profitability. For example, Berger (1995) is one of the most cited papers 
and employs a two-equation reduced form framework with three lags and control variables for a 
sample of US banks in the mid-to-late 1980s. His evidence shows Granger causality in both 
directions between earnings (measured as ROE) and capital (measured as book value of equity over 
assets). The positive causality from earnings to capital is explained by the hypothesis that banks 
retain some of their marginal earnings in the form of equity increases. The finding that higher capital 
is followed by higher earnings can be explained by two separate hypotheses: on one hand the 
bankruptcy cost hypothesis, and on the other the signalling hypothesis. Under the former, banks 
increase their earnings as the cost of uninsured debt decreases, since banks that were previously 
undercapitalised raise their capital levels closer to equilibrium levels. The latter hypothesis rather 
posits that bank management signals private information that prospects are good by increasing 
capital. That can be due to higher revenues, lower costs or reduced risk.  
Empirical studies that followed Berger’s work, such as those using banking data from the 
1990s (e.g. Demirguc- Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Goddard et al. 2004) and more recent ones that 
include the early 2000s, such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Gropp and Heider (2010), 
tend to find a positive relationship between bank capital and profitability. The former use a multi-
country panel of 1,334 banks operating in 101 countries to investigate how bank activity and funding 
strategies affect bank risks and return for the 1995-2007 period. They show that there is a positive 
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relationship between bank capital to assets and bank profitability (measured as pre-tax ROA) and a 
negative one with risk. The latter consider the determinants of bank capital structure for a sample of 
large US and European banks over 1991-2004. Gropp and Heider (2010)’s evidence suggests that 
more profitable, dividend paying banks with high market-to-book ratios face lower costs of issuing 
equity. According to the authors, the fact that more profitable banks tend to hold significantly more 
capital is explained by the lower cost of raising equity at short notice that these banks can benefit 
from because they are better known to outsiders and have more financial slack, so they can obtain a 
better price.  
In a US study, Berger and Bouwman (2013) examine the implications of greater capital for 
banks’ performance (proxied by bank survival and market share) during financial crises over the past 
quarter century. Results show not only that capital always enhances small banks’ probability of 
survival and market share, but also that it improves the performance of medium and large banks 
particularly during banking crises. Berger and Bouwman (2013) explore three channels through 
which capital may generate these effects. On the relationship between capital and profitability 
(ROE), the authors find that high-capital banks of all sizes improve their profitability during banking 
crises (although this result is not significant for medium banks) and market crises. In addition, they 
find that capital also enhances the profitability of small banks during normal times. These results 
generally support the hypothesis that capital improves bank profitability (although with ROA the 
results are confirmed for small banks, but are weaker for medium and large banks). One of the key 
results of this study is that the economic roles of capital vary in the cross section of banks depending 
on size and time period. 
  Lee and Hsieh (2013) use bank financial data for 42 Asian countries over 1994-2008 to 
investigate how and to what extent capital affects bank profits and riskiness. The authors employ 
four measures of bank profitability: ROA, ROE, net interest margins and net interest revenue over 
total assets, and their main methodology is GMM. They find a positive relationship between capital 
and profitability for the entire Asian banking sample and a negative one with risk. However, the 
ROA and ROE results often do not go in the same direction. Their evidence broadly suggests that the 
relationship significantly depends on bank types (namely, commercial versus investment and 
cooperative banks), countries’ income levels and geographical regions. 
In another cross-country study that includes twelve developed economies’ banking sectors, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) investigate the relationship between different measures of capital (Tier 
1 and 2 ratios, leverage and tangible equity) and stock market performance over a period that 
includes the financial crisis. They find that prior to the crisis higher capital (measured by the 
leverage ratio) resulted in higher stock returns in the full sample, but with a small coefficient and 
7 
 
marginal statistical significance. After the crisis, the Basel capital ratio is positive and (marginally) 
significant in the full sample during the crisis. Another important result is that the leverage ratio 
matters for equity prices especially in the sample of larger banks.  
Our study is novel because it employs a global sample and a long time period, that includes 
both normal and crisis times. The reason for the expectation of a positive relationship can be 
explained by referring to the basic theory of financial intermediation: banks exist because of the 
advantages they have in the production of information about borrowers via loan screening and 
contracting as well as monitoring customers’ behaviour in the long run. This causes an asymmetric 
information problem for banks vis-à-vis financial markets because, by having private information 
about their customers, bank managers will know more about the bank’s earnings prospects and 
financial conditions. Therefore, they may signal private information that prospects are good through 
capital decisions (Acharya, 1988).  Another interpretation of the positive relationship between capital 
and profits is given in the expected bankruptcy hypothesis. As noted in Berger (1995), if a bank is 
undercapitalised and the expected bankruptcy costs are high, higher capital should have a positive 
effect on the bank’s earnings by decreasing interest costs on uninsured debt.  
Several theoretical studies focus on banks’ monitoring incentives as key channels in the 
relationship between capital and performance. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Mehran and Thakor 
(2011) for example, find that greater bank capital increases performance by diminishing the moral 
hazard between shareholders and debtholders. This will increase the banks’ incentives to monitor 
debtholders, as bank failure is costlier for shareholders of well capitalized banks. Another 
interpretation (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) acknowledges that the market discipline imposed by the 
highly leveraged capital structure encourages banks to commit to monitoring their borrowers. 
Consequently, more capital will relax managers from this discipline (i.e. it will decrease monitoring 
incentives) and ultimately adversely affect banks’ performance.  
Regarding possible differences in the relationship between capital and profits in financially 
healthy vs. tough periods, we conjecture that in times of financial distress lower revenues might 
follow increases in capital. This may happen because, under the expected bankruptcy costs 
hypothesis, banks with greater than optimal insolvency risk would likely try to reduce the probability 
of failure both by increasing capital and by reducing portfolio risk (these measures could even be 
imposed by regulators). Lower portfolio risk is generally associated with lower expected revenues. 
Therefore, it is important to test our main hypothesis separately for normal versus turbulent times.  
Our interpretation of the signalling hypothesis results in a second stage analysis where we test 
possible channels through which the relationship between capital and profitability may operate, 
namely: (a) risk; (b) non-traditional activities; and (c) costs. The first channel is proxied by the risk 
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associated with traditional banking activities (i.e. the level of NPLs, or non-performing loans). 
Higher capital could induce banks to accept or take on more risk, which ensures higher interest and 
non-interest income. In other words, the relationship between capital and profits will be positive if 
more capitalised banks choose a riskier portfolio (higher NPLs) and higher profit volatility (higher 
standard deviation of ROA) and thus they will get more returns, but this could have adverse effects 
on their overall health. 
Another channel runs through the non-traditional bank activities and it is tested by including 
in the model the proportion of loans over assets. Since capital is costly, banks’ preference will be to 
increase revenues by accessing the non-traditional markets e.g. reducing on balance sheet loans 
and/or increasing activities in the non-traditional and shadow markets (e.g. via securitisation). This 
may reduce credit availability if there is no balance sheet expansion but only balance sheet 
adjustments. 
The relationship between capital and earnings could work also through bank costs, and this is 
verified using the ratio of banks’ total costs over total revenues. Essentially, the cost channel 
assumes that profits will increase if costs decrease, therefore we expect that better capitalised banks 
will be able to earn more profits via lower costs. This could be due to greater bank efficiency levels 
and/or better technology (Hughes and Mester, 2014). 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We use a multi-country panel of banks operating in 77 countries. Bank financial data are 
drawn from the international database BankScope over the period 2000-2013 while macroeconomic 
data are obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators. We focus on banks with at least an 
average of US $100m of total assets during the whole period. Among them, we select only those 
institutions that have at least 10% of total deposits to total assets and 25% of total loans to total 
assets, to ensure that the banks included in our sample are engaged in the credit intermediation 
activity. Our final sample consists of 24,848 observations on 4,414 banks. 
We employ three alternative measures of bank capital: Tier 1 capital over risk weighted 
assets (TIER1RWA); book value of equity over total assets (EQAST); capital surplus over the 
regulatory requirement
2
 (CAPSURPLUS). In line with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), we use 
                                                          
2
 The values of the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement are drawn from the ‘Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey’, carried out by the World Bank and providing information on bank regulation and supervision for 143 
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one period lag of bank capital in the regressions (i.e. the beginning of period values) to mitigate the 
endogeneity problem that could arise while dealing with the capital-profits relationship. We also 
perform some robustness checks – Granger-causality, instrumental variable and dynamic generalised 
method of moments regressions – to address the endogeneity issue more directly. Bank profitability 
is measured as Return on Assets (ROA), calculated as net income over total assets. We choose to 
focus on ROA, rather than on the Return on Equity (ROE), because, as Admati et al. (2013) note, the 
use of ROE becomes problematic when comparisons are made across different capital structures.
3
  
A set of bank-specific variables are included in all regressions as controls: the lagged value of 
ROA, to assess the importance of profits persistence; the natural logarithm of total assets (TOTAST), 
to take account of bank size; the liquidity ratio (LIQUIDITY), measured as non-customer deposits 
plus cash over total deposits (not far from the spirit of Gambacorta, 2011), to capture the role that 
holding more liquid liabilities has on banks’ profits (which could be either positive, if liquidity 
allows a better perception in funding markets and hence a reduction of financing costs, or negative, if 
liquidity levies an opportunity cost due to the need of keeping liquid liabilities and liquid assets in 
balance, which translates into lower returns relative to other assets); the ratio of non-performing 
loans to net loans (NPLs), to gauge the impact of credit risk on overall profitability; the loans to 
assets ratio (LOANAST), as a proxy for lending specialisation; the cost to revenue ratio (COSTREV), 
representing a measure of bank efficiency; the share of non-interest revenue over total revenue 
(NIRTR), as an index of banks’ income diversification. 
Concerning macroeconomic factors, we employ the GDP yearly rate of growth 
(GDPGROWTH), to control for countries’ economic conditions, and the domestic credit to GDP 
ratio (CREDITGDP), which accounts for the level of development of the banking sector and its 
relevance in financing the economic activity. The dummy for individual countries’ systemic banking 
crises (CRISIS) is constructed following Laeven and Valencia (2013). This is defined (p. 228) as an 
event that meets the two following conditions: i) significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system (e.g. significant bank runs, losses in the banking system and/or bank liquidations); and ii) 
significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking 
system.
4
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
jurisdictions. Four surveys have been conducted in 2001, 2003, 2007, and 2012. For the years prior to 2001 we assume 
that the minimum levels are the same of 2001, while for the remaining years not covered by any survey we use the values 
reported in the previous available survey. 
3
 As an example, Admati et al. (2013:14) observe that a manager who generates a 7% ROA with 20% capital will have an 
ROE of 15%, while a less productive manager who generates a 6.5% ROA but has 10% capital will have a ROE of 20%. 
Clearly, they operate with different capital structures, so a higher ROE does not necessarily imply that the second bank 
has deployed its assets more productively than the first. 
4
 As the Laeven and Valencia database coverage ends in 2011, for sake of simplicity in our remaining years (2012 and 
2013) we have confirmed the presence of a banking crisis for the countries marked as suffering such turmoil in 2011. 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study as well as the 
description and the specific data sources. Large variations can be observed in the banks’ profits and 
capital ratios (see also Gropp and Heider, 2010). The total banking observations by groups of 
country are reported in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for selected bank variables with significance levels. The 
correlation between capital variables and ROA is always positive and significant (ranging between 
+0.06 and +0.23). As expected, there is a remarkable correlation between TIER1RWA and 
CAPSURPLUS (+0.92). Focusing on the remaining variables, of relatively high magnitude is also the 
correlation coefficients between ROA and COSTREV (-0.61). 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
 
3.2 Methodological approach 
In our investigation regarding the impact of capital on bank profitability in an international 
setting, we have to consider the possibility of reverse causality between the two variables, which 
may bias our estimation. To correct for this potential problem, as mentioned in the introduction, our 
reference regressions resemble those by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), thus taking the lagged 
values of TIER1RWA, EQAST and CAPSURPLUS (as stated, we will later perform additional tests to 
deal with endogeneity issues).  
Our baseline model is the following: 
 
 
 
 
8
3
10
9
,,,11,,,1,,21,,1,,
j k
tcitctctcktcijtcitcitci CRISISX          (1) 
 
where the dependent variable i,c,t is the profitability (ROA) of bank i in country c in the year t. The 
main explanatory variable is the lagged capital measure κi,c,t-1; i,c,t-1 is the lagged profitability; Xi,c,t 
and ψc,t are, respectively, the six bank-specific variables and the two environmental variables; finally, 
CRISIS is the dummy for country-specific banking crises. We also control for country fixed effects 
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(c) and time fixed effects (t). Again, in line with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), the 
estimation is by ordinary least squares (OLS) with clustering of standard errors at the bank level, 
which ensures that they are consistent to potential heteroskedasticity and correlation within banks. 
For robustness, Appendix 1 reports some tests based on the full specification of Equation (1). 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline regression 
Results derived from our baseline model described in Equation (1) for the full sample are 
reported in Table 4. In particular, columns (1)-(3) report the regression results when considering the 
three specifications of bank capital as the only explanatory variables (together with country and time 
dummies), columns (4)-(6) encompass also bank-specific characteristics, and columns (7)-(9) further 
comprise macroeconomic and crisis variables. All coefficient signs and significances appear to be 
robust to the inclusion of additional control variables; hence, we will focus our discussion of results 
on the full specification in columns (7)-(9). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
We find a clear and strong indication that the relationship between capital, however 
measured, and ROA is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Our evidence 
gives therefore support to our hypothesis: a better capitalized bank is more profitable.
5
 
Consistent to the signalling hypothesis, this occurs because, by increasing capital, bank 
managers convey private information on good prospects, in terms of expectations of revenues, costs 
or risk, that are more favourable than is publicly thought. Particularly, as noted in Berger (1995), to 
the extent that management has a stake in the value of the bank (e.g. through personal ownership, 
stock options, etc.), it is less costly for a “good” bank to signal high quality through the increase in 
the level of capital than for a “bad” bank; thus, banks that expect to have better future performance 
have an incentive to have higher capital. With the expected bankruptcy hypothesis, a bank holding a 
higher level of capital tends to have lower expected bankruptcy costs (because the probability of a 
failure reduces, and the deadweight liquidation costs that must be absorbed by creditors in the event 
                                                          
5
 We have also estimated a model with only lagged ROA as explanatory variables. Results show that the R-square is 
0.4703, which is relatively high but significantly below the R-square of models (4)-(9). 
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of failure become more remote), and this in turn lowers interest expenses on uninsured debt, i.e. the 
cost of funding, thus raising bank’s profitability. 
Notwithstanding, the increase in profits predicted from our model for an increase in capital is 
relatively marginal. The estimated coefficient of TIER1RWA in column (7) indicates that an increase 
of one basis point in the ratio between Tier 1 capital and risk weighted assets generates, all else 
equal, a 0.0062 basis points growth of ROA. As an example, for a representative bank in our sample, 
a rise of Tier 1 over risk weighted assets by 5 basis points from the median value of 11.8% (a growth 
of about 42 percentage points) would move the bank from the 50th centile to the 82th centile of the 
Tier 1 distribution. In contrast, the estimated ROA for the same bank would rise from 0.82% to 
0.85% (an increase of 3.8 percentage points), corresponding to a shift from the 51th to the 53th 
centile. We get similar qualitative results when using EQAST – column (8) – and CAPSURPLUS – 
column (9) – as the capital variable. 
Under a policy perspective, this outcome would allow to deduce that, on one hand, increases 
in bank capital have a positive impact on profitability, but they are rather narrow; and on the other 
hand, that since they do not certainly produce negative effects on bank profits, the possibility that 
credit institutions finance a higher fraction of their lending with equity may appear reasonably 
acceptable. Miles et al. (2012) argues that substantially high capital requirements could create 
considerable benefits by reducing the probability of systemic banking crises. Nonetheless, excessive 
capital could result in greater idiosyncratic risk, such as traditional risk associated with lending 
and/or a shift towards less traditional assets away from lending activity.  
The evidence that a higher capital increases ROA fits with a model of banks’ asset expansion 
(Admati et al., 2013), where, because of e.g. increased capital requirements, banks expand their 
balance sheet by raising additional equity capital and using the proceeds to acquire new assets (see 
Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Due to the increase in equity and the consequential growth in assets, with the same level of 
profits ROA would tend to fall. However, banks will be able to increase income and profits owing to 
the related expansion in assets, which would positively impact ROA. The positive coefficients of the 
capital variables in Table 4 suggest that the increase in profits should be larger (in relative terms) 
than the assets growth. As Figure 1 portrays, the most effective way to obtain this result is to drive 
the additional assets mainly to non-traditional banking activities, which usually are riskier but they 
allow higher revenues (we will investigate this possibility later in this study). 
13 
 
Concerning the control variables, the coefficient of the lagged ROA is highly significant and 
amounts to about 0.33. This means that in the sample period banks’ profits appear to persist to a 
modest extent, and that in a global perspective banks are not much far from a competitive market 
structure, being able to retain only one third of their profit from year to year. Our evidence is broadly 
in line with that of Goddard et al. (2011), who focus on 65 countries and estimate an average 
persistence of profits (measured through ROE) of 0.43. 
The relation between size (lnTOTAST) and profitability is negative: the evidence that smaller 
banks are characterized by a higher ROA, while the opposite is true for their larger counterparts, is in 
line with the studies that found economies of scale for smaller banks and/or diseconomies for larger 
credit institutions (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Chronopoulos et al., 2015). The negative and 
significant sign of the LIQUIDITY coefficient makes clear that holding more liquid liabilities exerts a 
negative impact on banks’ profits, thus emphasizing that the ‘opportunity cost’ effect exceeds the 
‘signalling benefit’ effect. As expected, a higher portion of non-performing loans (NPLs), hence 
credit risk, negatively affects banks’ ROA, and the same occurs for the loans to assets ratio 
(LOANAST). In the latter case, we deduce that more profitable banks are those with a smaller loan 
portfolio, and consequently that try to take advantage of the access to non-traditional markets. This is 
confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient of the NIRTR variable, which proves that more 
diversified banks, i.e. those relying more on non-interest income, have a higher ROA, essentially 
because they are less exposed to loan impairments. Higher profits also characterize more efficient 
banks, i.e. those with a lower cost to revenue ratio (COSTREV). 
Banks that operate in countries with a high level of GDP growth (GDPGROWTH) appear to 
earn more profits; this is somewhat expected, as bank profitability should be procyclical if more 
lending increases interest income and if this in turn encourages economic activity via increased loan 
demand and lower provisions. In addition, more sizeable and developed credit markets 
(CREDITGDP) cause a reduction in profitability for banks, largely because they are also more 
crowded and hence competitive, so that banks’ margins are negatively affected (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999). Finally, the (expected) negative coefficient of the dummy variable CRISIS confirms 
that ROA is significantly lower during periods of banking crises.  
 
4.2 Dealing with endogeneity and reverse causality issues 
The results described so far hint that the relationship between bank capital and profitability is 
positive and significant. However, one should be cautious in interpreting the above findings, as the 
evidence of a causal relationship could be a mere (strong) correlation instead. In addition, there 
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might be a reverse causality between variables: for example, banks earning higher profits could 
decide to retain a significant portion of them, which would increase their capital. 
As already seen, we have tried to mitigate such potential endogeneity by means of the use of 
lagged capital variables in our empirical implementation, which is common in the economic 
literature of the field. We now address this endogeneity problem more directly. 
For the purpose, we employ three different strategies. We first perform a series of Granger-
causality tests to investigate the possibility that capital is causing profitability but at the same time 
there is reverse causation. In line with Berger (1995), we regress each variable yt on three annual lags 
of both itself (yt-1, yt-2, yt-3) and the other variable (xt-1, xt-2, xt-3): there will be Granger-causality going 
from x to y if the coefficients of the three lagged x’s variables are statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
Table 5 reports the results of these simple causality regressions – involving out three 
definitions of capital – in a compact way (all control variables are included in the regressions). The 
first column refers to the regression with ROA as the dependent variable and lagged values of both 
ROA and TIER1RWA as regressors. The sum of the coefficients of the three TIER1RWA lags amounts 
to 0.0052 and is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level: hence, higher levels of 
TIER1RWA seem to predict a higher future level of ROA (in line with our empirical evidence). In the 
same regression, the sum of the coefficients of the three ROA lags is equal to 0.4076 and is again 
significant at the 1% level, which indicates positive conditional serial correlation. On the other side, 
when we employ the same regressors but use TIER1RWA as the dependent variable (second column), 
we verify that the sum of the ROA gives -0.0429, a value that is not significantly different from zero, 
and conclude that ROA does not Granger-causes TIER1RWA (while the latter has significantly 
positive conditional serial correlation). Columns from third to sixth report the results of similar 
regressions with the other definitions of capital, from which we again deduce that increases in capital 
normally predict higher future values of profits, but not vice versa (the exception is EQAST, which 
exhibits a negative coefficient, meaning that increases in the level of the equity to assets ratio in the 
three preceding years predict lower current profits: however, the coefficient is not significant at the 
5% level). Similar to Berger (1995), we also find a higher R
2
 value in the regressions with the capital 
as the dependent variable, which indicates that capital is more stable and predictable than profits. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Summing up, there is no evidence of reverse causality going from profits to capital. 
Nonetheless, even if this test makes us confident that we would not need to control for possible 
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backward effects from ROA to capital, to account for the possibility that influences on a bank’s 
profits could cause it to adjust its level of capital, we have opted for using lagged values of the level 
of capital in our regressions, thus following the same approach of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010). 
The second strategy for identifying possible presence of endogeneity is an instrumental 
variable regression implemented using the Generalized Method of Moments (IV-GMM). 
Particularly, we apply IV-GMM with robust standard errors (whose estimates are generally 
considered as more efficient than the robust 2SLS estimates) and, to deal with potential endogeneity 
of the (lagged) bank capital variables, we use their third, fourth and fifth lags as instruments. We 
believe that these instruments are valid, as they should be correlated with the (lagged) capital but 
should not directly affect the level of bank profitability, and should also exhibit appropriate variation 
within a bank’s observations over time. This would be true only if banks’ capital varies sufficiently 
over time, and this is the reason why we consider lags of capital from third to fifth. 
The IV-GMM estimation results for the full specification of our model are shown in Table 6. 
In terms of sign and significance of coefficients, they are virtually the same as those we obtained in 
Table 4: a higher bank capital allows greater ROA (even if the coefficient magnitudes are slightly 
higher). The same holds for the set of control variables. In addition, the first-stage regressions (not 
reported here) show that the lagged capital variables are generally significant, which is supported by 
the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, as its null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 
5% level in all regression. Hence, we get confirmation of both the correct specification of the model 
and the validity of our choice of instruments, and hence of the overall estimates. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
As a third approach to control for possible reverse causality between capital and profits, we 
employ a dynamic panel data approach, where the equation to be estimated has at least one lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side. Particularly, we use a two-step system GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), where the first differenced values as well as 
lagged values are used as instruments for the lagged dependent variables. This estimator can be 
suitably employed when the left-hand-side variable is dynamic and depends on the past realizations, 
and some regressors may be endogenous. In addition, with respect to the first-difference GMM 
estimator, the system GMM can noticeably improve efficiency and avoid the weak instruments 
problem. It consists in the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with 
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lagged first differences as instruments) and the other in first differences (with lagged levels as 
instruments). Hence, the system GMM estimation only requires ‘internal’ instruments. 
Table 7 reports the results of the system-GMM estimations (still including all control 
variables). They again confirm the positive and significant relationship between our bank capital 
variables, on the one side, and ROA, on the other side. Also, the evidence regarding the control 
variables is generally coherent with the previous sets of results. We just note that the coefficients of 
both macroeconomic variables (GDPGROWTH and CREDITGDP), as well as LOANAST in two 
regressions over three, lose their significance. The rows with ROAt-1 confirm that there is persistence 
of profitability with no exceptions, as all lagged coefficients are positive and significantly different 
from zero. The persistence implies that higher than normal profits continued in banking markets over 
the years under study (as seen, this may be due to a certain degree of market power that banks enjoy 
in their own markets), even if the coefficient magnitude is lower than that characterizing both the 
OLS and the IV-GMM regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Regarding first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals of the estimated 
equations, as expected the AR(1) test is rejected (high first-order autocorrelation), while the AR(2) 
test cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level (no evidence of second-order autocorrelation). 
Under this respect, our GMM specification is consistent. In contrast, the Hansen tests of 
overidentifying restrictions (which verifies validity of the full instrument set) are rejected at the 5% 
level, thus casting doubts on the validity of instruments.
6
 
 
4.3 Channels in the relationship between bank capital and profitability  
The acceptance of the main hypothesis of a positive relationship between capital and profits, 
prompted us to carry out a second stage analysis where we verify possible channels through which 
the relationship may operate. Our conjectured channels are: i) banks accept greater risk; ii) banks 
access more the non-traditional markets; iii) banks improve their efficiency by reducing costs 
relative to revenues.  
                                                          
6
 The failure of this test, however, could be justified by a couple of reasons. First, the Hansen test should not be relied 
upon too faithfully, as it is prone to weaknesses (Roodman, 2009: 98). Furthermore, while performing some Monte Carlo 
experiments to assess potential biases of the Sargan/Hansen test statistic, Blundell and Bond (2000) observe some 
tendency for these test statistics to reject a valid null hypothesis too often in these experiments, and that this tendency is 
greater at higher values of the autoregressive parameter. 
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To this aim, we perform a first test by sorting our sample banks according to each of the 
capital variables and then classifying them into three groups. This procedure provides a 
straightforward way to identify more- and less- capitalized banks. Credit institutions with “low level 
of capital” and “high level of capital” are defined as those below the 33th percentile (bottom third) 
and above the 66th percentile (top third) of the distribution of the capital variable, respectively. Next, 
for each capital definition we record the mean values of NPLs, LOANAST and COSTREV variables – 
i.e. those proxying our channels – for each third, also adding the corresponding means of the 
profitability variable (ROA). Such mean values are presented in Table 8. The differences in mean 
NPLs, LOANAST, COSTREV and ROA between the first and third groups, which deliver an index of 
the spread in the corresponding distributions, are presented in the fourth column of each capital sub-
table. Since now, we notice that ROA always increases as we move upward from the bottom third, a 
further confirmation of the positive relationship between bank capital and profits. Moreover, the t-
statistics (last columns) show that the difference in mean ROA between the bottom third and the top 
third is always significant at the 1% level, with the top third capitalized banks enjoying profits from 
15% to 66% higher, depending on capital definition. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Turning to the first channel, if more capitalized banks try to earn more profits by accepting 
more credit risk, we would expect a growth in non-performing loans of banks in the top third, at least 
relative to banks in the bottom third. The NPLs averages show strong evidence of this effect, as the 
mean difference between the above groups is always positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. We also verify that banks in the top thirds suffer 30% to 45% more non-performing loans than 
banks in the bottom third. In the view of Delis et al. (2014), banks with higher levels of capital might 
take on higher risk in the next period because of a standard moral hazard problem, in which better 
capitalized banks feel quite safe and tend to undertake more risk. This in theory should have a 
negative effect on profits (e.g. Diamon and Rajan, 2001) as the disciplinary role of debt on managers 
would be weakened.
7
 The fact that we find a positive effect on NPLs and ROA confirms one hand 
the evidence of an evident risk/return trade-off and on the other that we could be in presence of risk 
shifting and/or that banks have to cut costs and operate in a more efficient way.  
                                                          
7
 Conversely, a conduit from capital to profits is the greater incentive to monitor borrowers as shareholders will lose 
more in case of failure (Holstrom and Tirole, 1997 and Mehran and Thakor, 2011). This would imply finding that more 
capitalised banks have lower NPLs. 
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Regarding the second channel, i.e. the possibility that more capitalized banks decide to 
operate more on the more profitable non-traditional markets (and correspondingly reduce the amount 
of loans they supply), we find that LOANAST significantly drops from the bottom to the top third 
when considering TIER1RWA and CAPSURPLUS (although differences are insignificant for 
EQAST). This could occur because of greater incentives of bank managers to shift to high risk/high 
return investments. 
Finally, the analysis of the difference in mean COSTREV helps to discover whether our third 
channel, i.e. an improvement in cost efficiency, is a way more capitalized banks follow to increase 
profits. We discover that this conjecture is valid, as banks in the top third of capital always 
significantly reduce the cost to income ratio relative to those in the bottom third of capital (the drop 
lies between 1% and 5%, showing that there is not ample room for reducing overall expenses and 
making better use of bank resources). 
Overall, the analysis above seems to provide robust evidence of the existence of our supposed 
channels through which banks with higher capital ratios can enjoy a higher profitability. 
A second way for testing the above channels is to perform a regression where the relevant 
variables – NPLs, LOANAST and COSTREV – are interacted with the measures of capital. Regarding 
the NPLs variable, if the estimated coefficient of the interaction terms turns out to be positive, this 
means that those banks which at the beginning of the period are characterized by a higher level of 
capital are also affected by increases in their non-performing loans, thus corroborating our 
conjecture. Similarly, if the interaction terms between either LOANAST or COSTREV and the capital 
variables show a negative sign, this would imply that more capitalized banks exhibit also lower 
levels of loans to assets ratio and cost to revenue ratio, again supporting our assumptions. 
The results of this extended model comprising the above interaction terms are shown in Table 
9. It emerges that the first channel (higher credit risk) generally works, since the interaction variable 
exhibits a significantly positive coefficient (at the 10% level when considering the capital variable 
EQAST). Regarding the other two channels (reduction of loans and cost efficiency), the evidence is 
not so conclusive as in the analysis involving the difference in means, since the coefficients of 
interaction terms involving LOANAST and COSTREV are negative and significant only for the 
leverage variable EQAST. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Summing up, there is clear evidence that more capitalised banks are more profitable because 
they are willing to bear more traditional risk. An ad-hoc test on difference in mean (not reported 
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here) for an additional variable, namely the standard deviation of ROA makes clear that more 
capitalised banks suffer from a higher standard deviation of ROA, i.e. a higher profit volatility. The 
latter result is in line with the empirical evidence of both Delis et al. (2014) and Mergaerts and 
Vander Vennet (2016), who find that higher capital ratios increase ROA volatility. Hence, more 
capital seems to induce to take on more risk, and the concurrent positive relationship between bank 
capital and profitability confirms the presence of a trade-off between risk and return, thus upholding 
the reinforcement of the capital requirements by Basel III as well as the need for an effective banking 
supervision. 
Our results are likely also to show that banks with higher capital earn more profits because 
they modify their business mix. They tend to reduce the proportion of loans over total assets and 
increase access to non-traditional markets. It follows that their higher income mostly derives from 
the extra assets (which in turn come from the higher level of capital) dispatched to non-traditional 
business, and this better explains our Figure 1, where in the right box we depict a situation where the 
additional equity is especially guided to purchasing new trading assets (bigger rectangle) rather than 
funding new loans (smaller rectangle). The cost channel also seems to work, as more capitalised 
banks appear to be more cost efficient (i.e. they display significantly lower costs relative to 
revenues). 
The above discussion allows us to get important insights, on one hand into the relationship 
between capital and accounting banking risks, on the other hand on the banks’ balance sheet strategic 
responses to capital requirements increases.  
 
4.4 The impact of economic, social and cultural factors 
Given our multi-country multi-year coverage, in this section we aim at providing some 
evidence on whether economic, social and cultural factors can shed further light on the (positive) 
relationship between bank capital and profitability, besides those that have been already incorporated 
in our previous empirical analyses. 
We first investigate possible and significant differences in the link between capital and profits 
in crisis and non-crisis periods. Particularly, we consider the role of both individual countries’ 
banking crises and the global financial crisis. In the first case, we build a group of interaction terms 
by multiplying the capital variables with two binary variables, NOCRISIS and CRISIS, derived from 
Laeven and Valencia (2013): for each country, they take value 1 in the years characterized by the 
absence or presence, respectively, of a local banking crisis (of course, in this case we drop the 
CRISIS variable from the regression). In the second case, we behave in a similar fashion, and interact 
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the capital variables with two binary variables (again, NOCRISIS and CRISIS) that assume value 1 in 
the periods 2000-2007 and 2008-2013, respectively. 
Our evidence is provided in Table 10 and it suggests some differences depending on whether 
we consider the notion of capital that is linked to regulatory requirements or the one representing the 
leverage ratio. In the estimations with TIER1RWA and CAPSURPLUS – columns (1) and (3) – we 
discover that, all else equal, during (either banking or global financial) crisis periods the same 
increase in capital translates in a higher level of profits: just as an example, an increase of one basis 
point in TIER1RWA was able to generate a 0.0042 basis points growth of ROA before the global 
crisis, and a 0.0084 basis points growth of profits in the crisis years. In other words, far from being a 
problem, in bad times having more capital allows banks to increase their profitability. Berger and 
Bowman (2013) find that capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily 
during banking crises. Our result is also a confirmation that crises emphasize the fragility of banks 
financed with short-term funds raised in the money markets rather than with capital (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012). 
From the bottom lines of Table 10 we deduce that the difference between non-crisis and crisis 
periods is also statistically significant (only at the 10% level for banking crises), thus finding clear 
support to the importance of capitalization in turmoil periods. When using a wider notion of capital, 
i.e. EQAST, the empirical findings are reversed: moving from non-crisis to crisis years, the 
relationship between capital and profitability drops to become indistinguishable from zero (and the 
difference in the coefficients of the interaction terms is significant between the 5% and the 10% 
level). Hence, we find that in crisis years, when it is reasonable to expect that banks’ income drops, 
holding more equity per dollar of assets does not affect profitability. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
A similar approach characterizes the second set of regressions, where we try to assess 
whether the strength of the relationship between capital and profitability differs significantly across 
alternative bank sizes. We therefore interact the capital variables with four size dummies based on 
banks’ average total assets over the sample period: SMALL (i.e. banks whose average total assets are 
below US$5bn), MEDIUM (i.e. banks with average total assets between US$5bn and US$50bn), 
LARGE (i.e. institutions whose average total assets exceed US$50bn, excluding GSIBs), and GSIBs 
(i.e. systemically important banks, based on the lists provided by the Financial Stability Board for the 
sample years). Table 11 reports that the strength of the relationship between capital and profitability 
differs across alternative bank sizes. First, while non-GSIBs banks in our sample display positive and 
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significant coefficients, for GSIBs the relationships of interest are never significant, meaning that 
changing capital requirements does not affect their profits. Among non-GSIBs, our findings suggest 
that the estimated marginal effect of bank capital on profitability is generally lower for smaller 
banks, while it progressively increases with size, even if only to some extent (the bottom rows of 
Table 11 clearly show that there is no significant difference among them). We are therefore in line 
with Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016), whose analysis shows that a high capital ratio appears to 
have the greatest impact on larger banks (i.e. those that are furthest away from the retail business 
model).  
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
For smaller banks, the lower impact of capital growth on profits can be attributable to 
reduced possibility of diversifying income sources. In fact, it might happen that an increase in capital 
that is followed by assets expansion is better exploited by larger banks because of their greater 
flexibility and business diversification. Finally, there could also be a ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect that 
tolerates larger banks to operate at lower capital levels. 
Another interesting inquiry involves the income level of countries, especially in a large 
heterogeneous sample of countries like ours. To check whether the relationship capital-profits varies 
across different buckets of countries, we split the sample using the World Bank income levels of the 
countries to whom banks belong. Particularly, we again interact the capital variables with two 
different dummy variables: LOWMIDDLE takes value 1 when the country is classified by the World 
Bank as a low or middle income country, while HIGH equals 1 for nations regarded as high income. 
The results of this empirical analysis are presented in Table 12. We find that the marginal effect of 
bank capital on profitability is slightly greater in lower and middle income countries than in their 
richer counterparts. It is possible that such results are driven by the fact that in high income countries 
the regulatory/monitoring activity is more stringent, effective and transparent than in less developed 
frameworks, which depresses profitability. However, the differences are quite small and the test of 
equality of coefficients (bottom rows of the table) fails to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
The last group of regressions focus on the role of three country characteristics: economic 
freedom, political stability, and corruption control. Since these factors are positively correlated, we 
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test them separately in the models. Unsurprisingly, all of them appear to exert major influence on 
banking markets and, in general, on firms’ behaviour.  
A good degree of economic freedom (with governments protecting and safeguarding the 
rights of economic agents) allows a more efficient functioning of markets, promotes a competitive 
background, and ultimately boosts economic growth. In this sense, it can increase the ability of banks 
in obtaining and managing more resources. On the other side, in such environment the fostered 
competition inevitably hits banks as well, so that revenues and profits may be negatively affected. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether economic freedom should affect banks’ performance in a positive 
or negative way (e.g.: Sufian and Habiboullah, 2010; Djalikov and Piesse, 2016). 
To assess the influence of economic freedom on the link between bank capital and 
profitability, we use the Index of Economic Freedom that the Heritage Foundation calculates every 
year for over 180 countries. It is built as an average of ten specific components of economic 
freedom, each being graded on a scale from 0 to 100. We then create two dummy variables, LOW 
and HIGH, marking each country for which the index is below or above the sample median value 
(equal to 71), respectively, and interact the capital variables. The regression results are exhibited in 
Table 13, columns (1)-(3). 
In all estimations, we find that more economic freedom translates into a reduced impact of 
bank capital on profitability. Such differences are statistically significant for EQAST and 
CAPSURPLUS, but not for TIER1RWA, also if in the latter case the estimated coefficients differ by 
more than 25%. Hence, in countries with higher freedom on the business that firms can undertake, 
more capitalized banks earn less profits compared to banks with a similar degree of capitalization 
operating in countries with lower economic freedom. This is likely to be the consequence of the 
higher level of competition that generally characterizes freer economies, a result that we have 
checked empirically by adding a competition variable drawn by the World Bank dataset.
8
 
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 
Another factor that could affect the capital-profits relationship in the banking industry is 
political stability. More stable governments and stronger institutions are likely to guarantee more 
stability in the economy. As Roe and Siegel (2011) note, a country’s capacity and willingness to 
build and maintain investor and property protection institutions depend largely on its relative 
                                                          
8
 The competition variable is the Lerner index by country. We find that for countries characterised by competition below 
the median value (i.e. by Lerner indices above the median value), the impact of greater capitalisation on profits is higher 
(and vice versa). Results are not reported but are available with the authors. 
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democratic political stability, while unstable policies cannot, or will not, reliably protect investors. 
Moreover, in a politically stable nation financial development can generate much more economic 
opportunities. However, Kleinhow and Nell (2009) surprisingly find that political stability may 
contribute to increase the systemic risk of European banks, possibly since in a stable system actors 
establish, operate, and interconnect financial institutions beyond the level that the institutional 
framework reliably provides, while in more unstable contexts links between financial units may 
disappear, in this way reducing the systemic risk and the possibility of contagion. 
To measure political stability, we employ the ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’ 
index from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database of the World Bank. For each country, it 
captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically‐ motivated violence and terrorism. Its value 
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values indicating greater political stability. Next, we again 
generate the binary variables LOW and HIGH, which identify countries with values of the index 
below or above the median value of the sample (amounting to 0.5), respectively. Lastly, we build 
interaction terms between the three capital variables and the above dummy variables, and use it in 
our regression model. Empirical results are reported in Table 13, columns (4)-(6). 
There is a robust and statistically significant evidence that in more stable countries more bank 
capital generates, all else equal, lower ROA than in more unstable nations. For example, doubling 
the regulatory capital surplus of a bank over the minimum requirement (i.e. CAPSURPLUS = +1) 
would cause a growth of ROA equal to 0.030% in the first group of countries and 0.054% in the 
second group. This is a somewhat unexpected result, as banks are supposed to be more profitable 
when there is political stability. One explanation could be that in difficult environments banks tend to 
build and maintain credit relationships with reliable borrowers who, in turn, need resources for their 
survival; it is clear that, if accessing to finance and lending is risky because of the instability of 
political institutions, loan rates will be higher (actually, in our sample their average values – 
calculated as the ratio between interest income and the volume of loans – amount to 9.7% and 7.8%, 
respectively, in countries with lower and higher political stability) and either screening and 
monitoring of borrowers will be tougher than it would be in normal conditions, both of which would 
positively affect banks’ profits. 
Regarding the role of corruption, it is widely recognized that it represents a severe obstacle to 
an optimal allocation of resources. If corruption is sometimes accepted as a ‘cost of doing business’ 
in many countries, it is increasingly seen as a barrier to development and economic growth 
(Wilhelm, 2002), especially through channels such as private investment and public expenditure 
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(Murphy et al., 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000; Beck et al., 2005). In an 
empirical analysis of cross-country differences in the rate of saving, Swaleheen (2008) demonstrates 
that corruption is positively correlated with real interest rates. 
As to the banking sector, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that in countries with an 
environment relatively free of corruption banks are characterized by lower interest margins (hence, 
profitability), because they may require a lower risk premium on their investments. This result is in 
line with the study by Ben Naceur and Omran (2011), who consider a selection of Middle East and 
North Africa countries and notice that corruption increases the net interest margins. Park (2012) 
shows that corruption significantly aggravates the bad loans problems, since it distorts the allocation 
of bank funds from normal projects to bad projects, which decreases the quality of private 
investments and hence economic growth. Zheng et al. (2013) obtain robust evidence that firms 
operating in collectivist countries perceive a higher level of lending corruption than firms in other 
countries, attributed to the influence that norms in collectivist societies have both on the interactions 
between bank officers and bank customers and on the dynamics among bank colleagues. In the same 
vein, working on a survey database concerning over 4,000 firms in 54 countries, Beck et al. (2005) 
also find that corruption of bank officials represents a significant constraint on firm growth. 
Following the same approach as before, our examination of the impact of corruption on the 
relationship between the levels of capital and profits in banking starts from splitting our sample into 
two groups. For the purpose, we make use of the ‘Control of Corruption’ index, again drawn from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators database managed by the World Bank. It captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests, and its value 
spans from -2.5 (the poorest level of corruption control, i.e. likely high corruption) to +2.5 (strong 
corruption control, i.e. low expected corruption). The above index helps again to split our sample 
into two parts by means of two dummy variables: LOW refers to countries with values below its 
median value (amounting to 1.27), while HIGH denotes countries above it. As before, they are 
interacted with the capital variables and become regressors for new estimations, whose results are 
exposed in Table 13, columns (7)-(9). 
The coefficients of the interaction variables show that banks operating in countries with more 
perceived corruption are generally characterized by higher marginal effects of bank capital on ROA, 
also if the gaps are statistically significant only for EQAST and (to a lesser extent) CAPSURPLUS. 
We interpret this result as evidence that, in line with Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Ben 
Naceur and Omran (2011), banks operating in a more corrupt environment have the possibility to 
charge higher interest on loans and lower interest for deposits, with positive impact on margins and 
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profits and irrespective of (or even notwithstanding) factors like management quality or efficiency. 
Therefore, the same increase of capital allows the above credit institutions to enjoy more profits than 
banks operating in countries with low corruption. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Bankers often argue that a higher bank capital will reduce their performance, yet the existing 
literature fails to offer an unambiguous prediction. Our study provides an in-depth empirical analysis 
on the relationship between alternative measures of bank capital and profitability in a large cross-
country setting. Our evidence suggests that, in line with most recent literature, the relationship 
between capital and Return on Assets (ROA) is consistently positive, although the impact appears 
relatively marginal. This is true for all definitions of capital – both those that are linked to regulatory 
requirements and the crude leverage ratio.  
The finding that increases in bank capital do not appear to produce negative effects on bank 
profits lends support to the possibility that bank managers signal private information that bank 
prospects are good by increasing capital. From a policy perspective, a key question is: what would be 
the effects of substantially high capital requirements for banks who intend to maintain their 
profitability on their strategies, operations and activities?  Our results on the possible channels offer 
some useful insights as we show that more capitalised banks typically have a greater idiosyncratic 
risk, mainly derived from higher credit risk, but also associated with a shift towards opaque non-
traditional assets. This is a crucial finding that challenges traditional views relying on the borrowers’ 
monitoring channel (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) that ignore the effect on profits from non-
traditional banking activities. On the positive side, our results show that more capitalised banks that 
are also more profitable are more effective at controlling their costs, although this might derive from 
closing branches and staff redundancies. 
Since we employ a global sample of banks operating in 77 developed and developing 
countries we also test the impact of economic factors (i.e. the financial crisis) as well as political and 
cultural ones. Our results suggest that the relationship between capital and profitability is stronger in 
crisis periods, for larger banks – although not for the largest i.e. the global systemically important 
ones –, and in lower and middle income countries. In addition, we find that in countries with lower 
economic freedom, less political stability and more corrupt environments, the same increase in 
capital allows banks to earn more profits than counterparts operating in countries with more 
economic freedom and political stability as well as lower corruption levels.  
26 
 
Our findings are robust to different specifications, endogeneity and robustness tests, and carry 
important implications for policy reforms aimed at ensuring both prosperity and soundness to the 
banking sector globally. Specifically, they clearly indicate that, although higher capital does not 
seem to hinder the profit opportunities of banks, there is clearly an expensive trade-off when it 
comes to greater risk taking and risk shifting that could ultimately affect global stability. 
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Appendix A 
A1. Additional Robustness checks 
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we lastly conduct some additional tests, still based 
on the full specification of Equation (1).  
First, we assess whether our results change when considering only banks for which at least 
75% of observations (i.e. at least 11 over 14) are available during the time span, in order to focus on 
a more balanced dataset, even though smaller. As columns (1)-(3) of Table A1 show, the positive 
relationship between bank capital and profitability is confirmed, also if the coefficient of EQAST 
loses its significance. We also note a drop in the significance levels of GDPGROWTH (now only at 
the 10% level), CREDITGDP and CRISIS. 
Second, we exclude US banks from the analysis, since they represent an important fraction of 
our sample. From columns (4)-(6) of Table A1 we again get proof that our results are robust, since 
the coefficients of the capital variables are all positive and highly significant (this holds also for the 
control variables, except CREDITGDP and CRISIS). 
Finally, we focus only on banks for which we observe only moderate changes in the values of 
TIER1RWA, EQAST and CAPSURPLUS from one year to another, as large yearly variations of 
capital variables might be due to mergers or acquisitions (as well as to financial difficulties) that 
could alter both the sign and the significance of the estimated coefficients. Particularly, in three 
different estimations we consider only banks for which the annual changes of TIER1RWA and 
EQAST range between -10% and +10%, and the annual change of CAPSURPLUS vary 
between -20% and +20%. Results reported in columns (7)-(9) of Table A1 indicate that our main 
inferences hold even under this alternative sample composition. 
 
[Insert Table A1 about here] 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  
(#of obs 24,848) 
Mean St.dev. Min Median Max 
ROA 0.8288 0.8359 -4.5832 0.8100 5.4715 
TIER1RWA 13.3677 6.1094 4.1000 11.8000 59.9000 
EQAST 9.7708 4.1294 1.9050 9.0348 38.7846 
CAPSURPLUS 0.8370 0.7012 -0.1200 0.6388 6.0963 
TOTAST 43,672.93 197,399.70 42.39 2,517.45 4,163,404.50 
LIQUIDITY 15.4986 16.1598 0.2029 9.4141 94.9643 
NPLs 4.2014 5.1714 0.0301 2.3551 39.9017 
LOANAST 63.6121 13.8217 25.0108 65.0978 94.8749 
COSTREV 75.1400 12.0051 8.0112 75.1976 214.4578 
NIRTR 19.1834 10.8968 0.0108 17.7303 91.6406 
GDPGROWTH 2.2226 3.0427 -14.8000 1.8765 26.1704 
CREDITGDP 70.1388 33.8139 7.1154 56.9859 311.7775 
CRISIS 0.3488 0.4766 0 0 1 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
ROA Net income/Total assets (%) Bankscope 
TIER1RWA Tier 1 capital/Risk weighted total assets (%, beginning of period) Bankscope 
EQAST Total equity/Total assets (%, beginning of period) Bankscope 
CAPSURPLUS (Total regulatory capital ratio-Minimum capital requirement ratio)/Minimum 
capital requirement ratio (beginning of period) 
Bankscope & World Bank 
TOTAST Total assets (millions 2005 USD) Bankscope 
LIQUIDITY (Non-customer deposits+Cash)/Total deposit (%) Bankscope 
NPLs Non-performing loans/Net loans (%) Bankscope 
LOANAST Net loans/Total assets (%) Bankscope 
COSTREV Total costs/Total revenue (%) Bankscope 
NIRTR Revenue from non-traditional activities/Total revenue (%) Bankscope 
GDPGROWTH GDP yearly rate of growth (%) World Bank 
CREDITGDP Domestic credit to private sector by banks/GDP (%) World Bank 
CRISIS Dummy for years with a banking crisis Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
 
  
32 
 
 
Table 2 – Sample countries, number of banks, and number of observations by World Bank region 
 
Region Countries Banks Obs. 
East Asia & Pacific 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Rep. of Korea, Singapore, Thailand 
496 2,161 
Europe & Central Asia 
Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom 
2,032 9,376 
Latin America & Caribbean Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama 151 652 
Middle East & North Africa 
Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
126 827 
North America Canada, United States of America 1,350 10,442 
South Asia Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 156 962 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda 
103 428 
Total 77 4,414 24,848 
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Table 3 – Correlation matrix 
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ROA 1             
TIER1RWA 0.1293* 1            
EQAST 0.2306* 0.7151* 1           
CAPSURPLUS 0.0588* 0.9242* 0.6161* 1          
TOTAST -0.0511* -0.1216* -0.1823* -0.0719* 1         
LIQUIDITY -0.0553* -0.0274* -0.0283* -0.0585* 0.1644* 1        
NPLs -0.2982* 0.1503* 0.1008* 0.1188* -0.0354* 0.1584* 1       
LOANAST -0.0632* -0.2522* -0.0300* -0.2618* -0.1895* -0.1590* -0.1221* 1      
COSTREV -0.6069* -0.0353* -0.1436* -0.0041 -0.0250* 0.0155* 0.0866* -0.0091 1     
NIRTR 0.1418* -0.0454* 0.0578* -0.0295* 0.1354* 0.1124* 0.0469* -0.1850* -0.1336* 1    
GDPGROWTH 0.3342* -0.0097 0.0004 -0.0487* 0.0006 0.0137* -0.2229* -0.1534* -0.1916* -0.0334* 1   
CREDITGDP -0.2294* -0.0901* -0.1838* -0.0119 0.2121* 0.2084* 0.1071* 0.0217* 0.0099 0.0104 -0.1950* 1  
CRISIS -0.3326* 0.0432* 0.0376* 0.0927* 0.0342* 0.1205* 0.2266* 0.0955* 0.1835* 0.0357* -0.4740* 0.1655* 1 
* = the level of the correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level or better. 
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Table 4 – The relationship between capital and profitability (ROA): baseline regressions 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0138*** - - 0.0064*** - - 0.0062*** - - 
 (7.99)   (6.53)   (6.35)   
EQAST(t-1) - 0.0363*** - - 0.0053*** - - 0.0049*** - 
  (11.37)   (3.19)   (2.93)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.1004*** - - 0.0449*** - - 0.0434*** 
   (6.64)   (5.43)   (5.29) 
ROA(t-1) - - - 0.3296*** 0.3314*** 0.3313*** 0.3298*** 0.3318*** 0.3315*** 
    (25.98) (26.15) (26.18) (25.88) (26.06) (26.08) 
lnTOTAST(t) - - - -0.0335*** -0.0379*** -0.0360*** -0.0332*** -0.0375*** -0.0356*** 
    (-12.42) (-13.9) (-13.43) (-12.25) (-13.74) (-13.21) 
LIQUIDITY(t) - - - -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** 
    (-6.01) (-6.07) (-5.98) (-5.69) (-5.75) (-5.66) 
NPLs(t) - - - -0.0301*** -0.0301*** -0.0302*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0289*** 
    (-18.69) (-18.28) (-18.67) (-17.76) (-17.36) (-17.73) 
LOANAST(t) - - - -0.0021*** -0.0030*** -0.0023*** -0.0021*** -0.0029*** -0.0022*** 
    (-5.51) (-8.55) (-5.82) (-5.43) (-8.42) (-5.72) 
COSTREV(t) - - - -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0304*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** 
    (-37.91) (-37.74) (-37.92) (-37.86) (-37.7) (-37.88) 
NIRTR(t) - - - 0.0072*** 0.0068*** 0.0071*** 0.0070*** 0.0066*** 0.0070*** 
    (10.51) (10.2) (10.38) (10.16) (9.86) (10.03) 
GDPGROWTH(t) - - - - - - 0.0131*** 0.0135*** 0.0132*** 
       (4.05) (4.17) (4.07) 
CREDITGDP(t) - - - - - - -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** 
       (-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.31) 
CRISIS(t) - - - - - - -0.0475*** -0.0463*** -0.0486*** 
       (-2.75) (-2.67) (-2.81) 
N 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 
R2 0.2645 0.2803 0.2620 0.6671 0.6661 0.6667 0.6680 0.6670 0.6676 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Table 5 – Granger-causality tests between capital and profitability 
 
  Dependent variables 
  ROA TIER1RWA ROA EQAST ROA CAPSURPLUS 
Lagged 
regressors 
ROA 0.4076*** -0.0429 0.4571*** -0.0470 0.4103*** -0.0014 
 (305.08) (0.27) (318.94) (0.52) (314.52) (0.02) 
TIER1RWA 0.0052*** 0.8727*** - - - - 
 (20.41) (8493.40)     
EQAST - - -0.0039* 0.8859*** - - 
   (3.12) (14852.02)   
CAPSURPLUS - - - - 0.0390*** 0.8627*** 
     (16.44) (7687.24) 
 N 20,113 20,098 20,305 20,284 20,058 20,012 
 R2 0.6707 0.8672 0.6690 0.8593 0.6698 0.8467 
Reported values are the sum of the estimated coefficients of the three lags of the row variables in regressions where the dependent variables are the 
column variables. Significance for the coefficient sums: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
All regressions also include control variables, country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). Standard errors are clustered at bank 
level.  
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Table 6 – The relationship between capital and profitability (ROA): IV-GMM estimates 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0105*** - - 
 (6.00)   
EQAST(t-1) - 0.0073** - 
  (2.55)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.0839*** 
   (5.98) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3313*** 0.3425*** 0.3335*** 
 (19.28) (20.17) (19.46) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0369*** -0.0446*** -0.0403*** 
 (-10.14) (-12.65) (-11.30) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0016*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** 
 (-3.40) (-4.17) (-3.58) 
NPLs(t) -0.0344*** -0.0323*** -0.0345*** 
 (-14.62) (-13.63) (-14.67) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0019*** -0.0033*** -0.0020*** 
 (-3.56) (-7.33) (-3.71) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0287*** -0.0287*** -0.0287*** 
 (-28.83) (-28.74) (-28.57) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0078*** 0.0072*** 0.0078*** 
 (9.13) (8.85) (9.17) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0147*** 0.0157*** 0.0149*** 
 (2.72) (3.03) (2.77) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0015** -0.0012* -0.0014** 
 (-2.49) (-1.93) (-2.05) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0627*** -0.0547** -0.0522** 
 (-2.88) (-2.43) (-2.30) 
N 14,239 14,641 14,233 
R2 0.6025 0.6014 0.6015 
J statistic 2.1503 3.0292 2.6422 
 (0.34) (0.22) (0.27) 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. z-values in parentheses. 
All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). Standard errors are clustered at bank level. 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag and have been instrumented by their third, fourth and fifth order lags. The null hypothesis 
of the Sargan-Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions is that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and that 
the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation (p-value in parentheses). 
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Table 7 – The relationship between capital and profitability (ROA): system GMM estimates 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0228*** - - 
 (5.54)   
EQAST(t-1) - 0.0236*** - 
  (3.86)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.1823*** 
   (4.95) 
ROA(t-1) 0.2152*** 0.2220*** 0.2135*** 
 (13.24) (13.59) (13.23) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0426*** -0.0626*** -0.0519*** 
 (-3.17) (-4.76) (-3.96) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0027*** -0.0029*** -0.0027*** 
 (-3.36) (-3.72) (-3.36) 
NPLs(t) -0.0508*** -0.0489*** -0.0525*** 
 (-14.64) (-14.16) (-14.70) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0016 -0.0042*** -0.0021 
 (-1.25) (-3.38) (-1.61) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0362*** -0.0362*** -0.0365*** 
 (-27.29) (-27.09) (-27.63) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0090*** 0.0082*** 0.0085*** 
 (6.28) (5.70) (5.92) 
GDPGROWTH(t) -0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 
 (-0.01) (0.23) (0.04) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-0.52) (0.36) (-0.41) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0636*** -0.0607*** -0.0637*** 
 (-3.22) (-2.98) (-3.22) 
N 24,830 24,817 24,774 
AR(1) -13.38 -13.36 -13.35 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) -1.08 -0.90 -1.16 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.28 0.37 0.25 
Hansen J test 881.46 892.83 881.23 
Hansen J test (p-value)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses) are based on two-step standard 
errors clustered by bank and incorporating theWindmeijer correction. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not 
reported). 
Capital variables are treated as endogenous; bank variables are treated as predetermined; country-level variables, time dummies and country dummies 
are treated as exogenous. Regressors have been instrumented by their second and third order lags. The Hansen J statistic tests the instruments’ joint 
validity. 
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Table 8 – Means of NPLs, LOANAST, COSTREV, and ROA by thirds of capital variables 
 
Capital variable: TIER1RWA(t-1) 
Variable  
Bottom 
third 
Middle 
third 
Top 
third 
Mean difference 
(top-bottom) 
t-value  
NPLs(t) 3.65 3.68 5.30 +1.65 -19.59 *** 
LOANAST(t) 66.45 64.66 59.71 -6.74 31.52 *** 
COSTREV(t) 75.91 75.16 74.36 -1.55 8.08 *** 
ROA(t) 0.70 0.82 0.97 +0.27 -20.53 *** 
t-tests test the hypothesis that each variable has the same mean within the group of TIER1RWA below the 33th percentile (bottom third) and the group 
of TIER1RWA above the 66th centile (top third). Significance levels: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level.  
 
Capital variable: EQAST(t-1) 
Variable  
Bottom 
third 
Middle 
third 
Top 
third 
Mean difference 
(top-bottom) 
t-value  
NPLs(t) 3.88 3.58 5.16 +1.28 -15.46 *** 
LOANAST(t) 62.52 66.02 62.21 -0.31 1.42  
COSTREV(t) 77.30 74.90 73.22 -4.08 21.38 *** 
ROA(t) 0.62 0.84 1.03 +0.41 -30.29 *** 
t-tests test the hypothesis that each variable has the same mean within the group of EQAST below the 33th percentile (bottom third) and the group of 
EQAST above the 66th centile (top third). Significance levels: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level.  
 
Capital variable: CAPSURPLUS(t-1) 
Variable  
Bottom 
third 
Middle 
third 
Top 
third 
Mean difference 
(top-bottom) 
t-value  
NPLs(t) 3.85 3.78 5.00 +1.15 -13.73 *** 
LOANAST(t) 66.74 64.57 59.47 -7.27 34.24 *** 
COSTREV(t) 75.50 75.04 74.89 -0.61 3.18 *** 
ROA(t) 0.78 0.82 0.89 +0.11 -8.00 *** 
t-tests test the hypothesis that each variable has the same mean within the group of CAPSURPLUS below the 33th percentile (bottom third) and the 
group of CAPSURPLUS above the 66th centile (top third). Significance levels: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level.  
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Table 9 – The relationship between capital and profitability (ROA): testing channels 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0028 - - 
 (0.35)   
EQAST(t-1) - 0.0808*** - 
  (6.56)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - -0.0703 
   (-0.96) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3269*** 0.3213*** 0.3286*** 
 (25.59) (25.43) (25.76) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0337*** -0.0363*** -0.0360*** 
 (-12.45) (-13.51) (-13.38) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0019*** -0.0021*** -0.0019*** 
 (-5.47) (-6.05) (-5.40) 
NPLs(t) -0.0394*** -0.0361*** -0.0361*** 
 (-15.08) (-10.05) (-17.58) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0025*** -0.0010 -0.0027*** 
 (-3.21) (-1.11) (-5.14) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0298*** -0.0209*** -0.0309*** 
 (-20.79) (-14.65) (-29.28) 
NPLs(t)TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0006*** - - 
 (5.25)   
LOANAST(t)TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0000 - - 
 (0.59)   
COSTREV(t)TIER1RWA(t-1) -0.0000 - - 
 (-0.31)   
NPLs(t)EQAST(t-1) - 0.0006* - 
  (1.89)  
LOANAST(t)EQAST(t-1) - -0.0002** - 
  (-1.96)  
COSTREV(t)EQAST(t-1) - -0.0009*** - 
  (-6.78)  
NPLs(t)CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.0062*** 
   (6.16) 
LOANAST(t)CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.0006 
   (1.20) 
COSTREV(t)CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.0006 
   (0.78) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0070*** 0.0068*** 0.0070*** 
 (10.05) (10.38) (9.89) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0125*** 0.0128*** 0.0123*** 
 (3.86) (3.99) (3.83) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0010** -0.0009** -0.0010** 
 (-2.25) (-1.98) (-2.33) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0373** -0.0334* -0.0396** 
 (-2.14) (-1.90) (-2.27) 
N 24,848 24,848 24,848 
R2 0.6690 0.6711 0.6691 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Table 10 – The relation between capital and profitability (ROA): non-crisis vs. crisis years 
 
 
COUNTRY- SPECIFIC BANKING CRISES 
(years vary by country) 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(pre-2008 vs. post-2007) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
TIER1RWA(t-1)NOCRISIS(t) 0.0056*** - - 0.0042*** - - 
 (5.55)   (3.98)   
TIER1RWA(t-1)CRISIS(t) 0.0073*** - - 0.0084*** - - 
 (5.96)   (6.28)   
EQAST(t-1)NOCRISIS(t) - 0.0062*** - - 0.0072*** - 
  (3.61)   (3.65)  
EQAST(t-1)CRISIS(t) - 0.0025 - - 0.0028 - 
  (1.18)   (1.22)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)NOCRISIS(t) - - 0.0357*** - - 0.0258*** 
   (4.04)   (2.84) 
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)CRISIS(t) - - 0.0571*** - - 0.0655*** 
   (4.97)   (5.59) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3302*** 0.3318*** 0.3320*** 0.3296*** 0.3317*** 0.3314*** 
 (25.92) (26.07) (26.12) (25.88) (26.06) (26.08) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0329*** -0.0372*** -0.0353*** -0.0333*** -0.0373*** -0.0356*** 
 (-12.15) (-13.69) (-13.13) (-12.34) (-13.70) (-13.24) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** 
 (-5.75) (-5.79) (-5.69) (-5.82) (-5.72) (-5.75) 
NPLs(t) -0.0296*** -0.0289*** -0.0295*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0288*** 
 (-18.28) (-17.55) (-18.31) (-17.79) (-17.34) (-17.75) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0021*** -0.0030*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0029*** -0.0022*** 
 (-5.36) (-8.46) (-5.65) (-5.54) (-8.36) (-5.81) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** 
 (-37.93) (-37.72) (-37.95) (-37.92) (-37.72) (-37.94) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0070*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 0.0070*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 
 (10.08) (9.85) (9.94) (10.05) (9.89) (9.89) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0149*** 0.0136*** 0.0149*** 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 0.0131*** 
 (4.69) (4.25) (4.68) (4.08) (4.14) (4.04) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0009* -0.0010** -0.0009** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0011** 
 (-1.92) (-2.22) (-2.00) (-2.31) (-2.22) (-2.38) 
CRISIS(t) - - - -0.0493*** -0.0449*** -0.0542*** 
    (-2.82) (-2.59) (-3.09) 
N 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 
R2 0.6679 0.6671 0.6675 0.6682 0.6671 0.6679 
CAPNOCRISIS=CAPCRISIS (F-test) 2.81* 4.74** 3.53* 8.54*** 2.88* 9.61*** 
CAPNOCRISIS=CAPCRISIS (p-value) 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Table 11 – The relation between capital and profitability (ROA): estimations for bank size subgroups 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
TIER1RWA(t-1)SMALL(t) 0.0057*** - - 
 (5.65)   
TIER1RWA(t-1)MEDIUM(t) 0.0078*** - - 
 (6.04)   
TIER1RWA(t-1)LARGE(t) 0.0090*** - - 
 (4.30)   
TIER1RWA(t-1)GSIBs(t) -0.0032 - - 
 (-1.03)   
EQAST(t-1)SMALL(t) - 0.0048*** - 
  (2.74)  
EQAST(t-1)MEDIUM(t) - 0.0050** - 
  (2.45)  
EQAST(t-1)LARGE(t) - 0.0054* - 
  (1.73)  
EQAST(t-1)GSIBs(t) - -0.0046 - 
  (-0.95)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)SMALL(t) - - 0.0394*** 
   (4.41) 
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)MEDIUM(t) - - 0.0613*** 
   (4.39) 
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)LARGE(t) - - 0.0659*** 
   (2.63) 
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)GSIBs(t) - - -0.0516 
   (-1.13) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3296*** 0.3318*** 0.3313*** 
 (25.87) (26.08) (26.08) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0386*** -0.0378*** -0.0383*** 
 (-9.20) (-8.51) (-11.02) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** 
 (-5.61) (-5.75) (-5.62) 
NPLs(t) -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0289*** 
 (-17.74) (-17.32) (-17.70) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0021*** -0.0029*** -0.0022*** 
 (-5.42) (-8.44) (-5.78) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** 
 (-37.84) (-37.68) (-37.87) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0070*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 
 (10.18) (9.93) (10.03) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0131*** 0.0135*** 0.0132*** 
 (4.05) (4.17) (4.07) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** 
 (-2.16) (-2.26) (-2.27) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0494*** -0.0464*** -0.0502*** 
 (-2.86) (-2.66) (-2.90) 
N 24,848 24,848 24,848 
R2 0.6681 0.6670 0.6677 
CAPSMALL=CAPLARGE (F-test) 2.42 0.03 1.00 
CAPSMALL=CAPLARGE (p-value) 0.12 0.86 0.32 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Table 12 – The relation between capital and profitability (ROA): estimations for country income level subgroups 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
TIER1RWA(t-1)LOWMIDDLE(t) 0.0064*** - - 
 (2.70)   
TIER1RWA(t-1)HIGH(t) 0.0061*** - - 
 (5.94)   
EQAST(t-1)LOWMIDDLE(t) - 0.0082** - 
  (2.40)  
EQAST(t-1)HIGH(t) - 0.0035* - 
  (1.85)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)LOWMIDDLE(t) - - 0.0455** 
   (2.04) 
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)HIGH(t) - - 0.0430*** 
   (4.97) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3297*** 0.3316*** 0.3314*** 
 (25.87) (26.03) (26.07) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0332*** -0.0375*** -0.0356*** 
 (-12.25) (-13.78) (-13.21) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0020*** 
 (-5.70) (-5.89) (-5.67) 
NPLs(t) -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0289*** 
 (-17.75) (-17.31) (-17.71) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0021*** -0.0030*** -0.0022*** 
 (-5.43) (-8.54) (-5.75) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** 
 (-37.83) (-37.63) (-37.85) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0070*** 0.0066*** 0.0070*** 
 (10.06) (9.74) (9.95) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0131*** 0.0135*** 0.0132*** 
 (4.05) (4.17) (4.08) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** 
 (-2.25) (-2.28) (-2.31) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0474*** -0.0438** -0.0486*** 
 (-2.74) (-2.50) (-2.81) 
N 24,848 24,848 24,848 
R2 0.6680 0.6671 0.6676 
CAPLOWMIDDLE=CAPHIGH (F-test) 0.01 1.44 0.01 
CAPLOWMIDDLE=CAPHIGH (p-value) 0.92 0.23 0.91 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Table 13 – The relation between capital and profitability (ROA): economic, political and social characteristics 
 
 ECONOMIC FREEDOM POLITICAL STABILITY CORRUPTION CONTROL 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
TIER1RWA(t-1)LOW(t) 0.0070*** - - 0.0072*** - - 0.0069*** - - 
 (5.77)   (6.82)   (5.47)   
TIER1RWA(t-1)HIGH(t) 0.0051*** - - 0.0048*** - - 0.0053*** - - 
 (4.28)   (4.64)   (4.45)   
EQAST(t-1)LOW(t) - 0.0082*** - - 0.0070*** - - 0.0081*** - 
  (4.09)   (3.98)   (3.82)  
EQAST(t-1)HIGH(t) - 0.0006 - - 0.0017 - - 0.0013 - 
  (0.25)   (0.93)   (0.57)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)LOW(t) - - 0.0569*** - - 0.0542*** - - 0.0548*** 
   (5.21)   (5.77)   (4.98) 
CAPSURPLUS(t-1)HIGH(t) - - 0.0283*** - - 0.0304*** - - 0.0313*** 
   (2.75)   (3.14)   (3.07) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3294*** 0.3312*** 0.3308*** 0.3288*** 0.3306*** 0.3308*** 0.3296*** 0.3313*** 0.3310*** 
 (25.81) (25.98) (25.97) (25.76) (25.97) (26.01) (25.82) (25.97) (25.98) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0331*** -0.0369*** -0.0354*** -0.0334*** -0.0380*** -0.0357*** -0.0332*** -0.0371*** -0.0355*** 
 (-12.23) (-13.55) (-13.08) (-12.28) (-13.82) (-13.23) (-12.25) (-13.66) (-13.14) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** 
 (-5.68) (-5.79) (-5.63) (-5.59) (-5.62) (-5.62) (-5.66) (-5.73) (-5.61) 
NPLs(t) -0.0290*** -0.0290*** -0.0292*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0289*** -0.0290*** -0.0289*** -0.0291*** 
 (-17.89) (-17.54) (-18.00) (-17.73) (-17.33) (-17.70) (-17.84) (-17.51) (-17.94) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0021*** -0.0029*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0030*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0029*** -0.0022*** 
 (-5.49) (-8.47) (-5.79) (-5.51) (-8.53) (-5.78) (-5.48) (-8.40) (-5.78) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0304*** -0.0304*** -0.0304*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** -0.0303*** 
 (-37.84) (-37.65) (-37.85) (-37.71) (-37.58) (-37.78) (-37.84) (-37.61) (-37.85) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0070*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 0.0071*** 0.0067*** 0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 
 (10.07) (9.91) (9.93) (10.20) (9.94) (10.06) (10.08) (9.92) (9.95) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0131*** 0.0132*** 0.0133*** 0.0141*** 0.0149*** 0.0139*** 0.0132*** 0.0135*** 0.0133*** 
 (4.05) (4.09) (4.10) (4.28) (4.54) (4.25) (4.07) (4.19) (4.10) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0011** -0.0012*** -0.0011** -0.0010** -0.0011** -0.0011** 
 (-2.23) (-2.22) (-2.31) (-2.46) (-2.69) (-2.47) (-2.28) (-2.41) (-2.36) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0468*** -0.0424** -0.0424*** -0.0407** -0.0345** -0.0439** -0.0463*** -0.0410** -0.0471*** 
 (-2.71) (-2.43) (-2.73) (-2.33) (-1.97) (-2.52) (-2.68) (-2.34) (-2.72) 
N 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 24,848 
R2 0.6680 0.6674 0.6677 0.6682 0.6675 0.6677 0.6680 0.6673 0.6677 
CAPLOW=CAPHIGH(F-test) 1.64 7.44*** 4.40** 9.62*** 19.06*** 6.34** 1.05 5.75** 2.98* 
CAPLOW=CAPHIGH(p-value) 0.20 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.08 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Table A1 – The relationship between capital and profitability (ROA): robustness estimates 
 
 
BANKS WITH AT LEAST 11 
OBSERVATIONS OVER 14 
EXCLUDING US BANKS 
BANKS WITH MODERATE ANNUAL 
CHANGES IN CAPITAL VARIABLES 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
TIER1RWA(t-1) 0.0060*** - - 0.0058*** - - 0.0076*** - - 
 (3.18)   (4.81)   (6.55)   
EQAST(t-1) - 0.0011 - - 0.0074*** - - 0.0046** - 
  (0.26)   (3.61)   (2.35)  
CAPSURPLUS(t-1) - - 0.0469*** - - 0.0409*** - - 0.0558*** 
   (2.95)   (3.95)   (5.70) 
ROA(t-1) 0.3213*** 0.3286*** 0.3225*** 0.3521*** 0.3504*** 0.3539*** 0.3633*** 0.3982*** 0.3587*** 
 (14.93) (15.31) (15.03) (22.44) (22.12) (22.69) (23.62) (25.48) (22.77) 
lnTOTAST(t) -0.0432*** -0.0493*** -0.0451*** -0.0269*** -0.0275*** -0.0294*** -0.0342*** -0.0407*** -0.0374*** 
 (-10.54) (-11.84) (-10.96) (-7.85) (-7.78) (-8.61) (-11.98) (-14.08) (-12.78) 
LIQUIDITY(t) -0.0030*** -0.0032*** -0.0030*** -0.0022*** -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0018*** 
 (-4.87) (-5.26) (-4.85) (-5.88) (-6.02) (-5.84) (-4.51) (-4.70) (-4.37) 
NPLs(t) -0.0333*** -0.0328*** -0.0334*** -0.0248*** -0.0248*** -0.0248*** -0.0306*** -0.0290*** -0.0299*** 
 (-11.65) (-11.10) (-11.71) (-14.58) (-14.41) (-14.57) (-15.25) (-14.71) (-15.06) 
LOANAST(t) -0.0029*** -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0023*** -0.0031*** -0.0024*** -0.0017*** -0.0030*** -0.0018*** 
 (-4.31) (-6.23) (-4.40) (-4.58) (-6.85) (-4.74) (-4.01) (-8.26) (-4.22) 
COSTREV(t) -0.0292*** -0.0293*** -0.0292*** -0.0315*** -0.0314*** -0.0316*** -0.0291*** -0.0280*** -0.0290*** 
 (-24.43) (-24.28) (-24.47) (-32.97) (-32.86) (-33.02) (-32.31) (-30.88) (-32.51) 
NIRTR(t) 0.0086*** 0.0083*** 0.0085*** 0.0024*** 0.0019** 0.0023*** 0.0079*** 0.0069*** 0.0080*** 
 (7.12) (6.83) (7.10) (2.93) (2.41) (2.84) (10.50) (10.13) (10.78) 
GDPGROWTH(t) 0.0123* 0.0130* 0.0123* 0.0135*** 0.0136*** 0.0135*** 0.0089*** 0.0060* 0.0095*** 
 (1.71) (1.81) (1.70) (3.75) (3.82) (3.77) (2.74) (1.80) (2.81) 
CREDITGDP(t) -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0013*** -0.0015*** -0.0013** 
 (-0.78) (-0.88) (-0.81) (-1.39) (-1.31) (-1.39) (-2.67) (-3.14) (-2.56) 
CRISIS(t) -0.0367 -0.0379 -0.0373 -0.0237 -0.0205 -0.0255 -0.0556*** -0.0517*** -0.0514** 
 (-1.26) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.11) (-0.95) (-1.19) (-2.86) (-2.74) (-2.51) 
N 9,702 9,702 9,702 14,527 14,527 14,527 18,254 18,386 18,212 
R2 0.6676 0.6664 0.6675 0.6991 0.6988 0.6987 0.6837 0.6854 0.6826 
Significance for the parameter estimates: *** = 1% level; ** = 5% level; * = 10% level. t-values (in parentheses). 
Capital variables enter the estimations with a one year lag. All regressions include country and time fixed effects (coefficients are not reported). 
Standard errors are clustered at bank level.  
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Figure 1 – Asset expansion as a response to increased capital requirement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Admati et al. (2013).  
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